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A review of managerial literature highlights the crucial importance of shared
culture and common schemes of interpretation in organisational learning. The
interpretative and sensemaking approaches of organisational learning insert
themselves deeply in the process of the construction of social uniformity and
cognitive homogeneity. Individual learning, culture, beliefs and rationality - the
shared mental models - are the targets of confirmation processes. Thus, this
specific kind of organisational learning cannot be considered as normatively
neutral, but as a political process.
A case study of a bank illustrates that organisational learning can be based
on a structured social construction of cognitive homogeneity which generates
an increase of control and enhances power of the management by reinforcing
the legitimacy of decisions. However, this case study also shows that learning
and non-learning are the two faces of the same process or, in other words, that
organisational learning can produce unawareness and unintentional non-
learning by too much cultural uniformity.
Zusammenfassung
Eine Durchsicht der Managementliteratur verdeutlicht die zentrale Bedeutung
gemeinsamer Kultur und geteilter Deutungsmuster für das Organisationslernen.
Die interpretativen und deutungsbezogenen Ansätze des Organisationslernens
basieren auf tiefgreifenden Prozessen zur Konstruktion sozialer Einheitlichkeit
und kognitiver Homogenität. Die Absicherungsprozesse beziehen sich auf das
individuelle Lernen, Kultur, Werthaltungen und Rationalität - die gemeinsamen
mentalen Modelle. Insofern kann diese Form des Organisationslernens nicht als
wertneutral angesehen werden; es handelt sich vielmehr um einen politischen
Prozeß.
An einer Fallstudie in einer Bank wird illustriert, daß Organisationslernen
auf einer sozial konstruierten kognitiven Homogenität aufgebaut werden kann.
Dabei wird Management-Kontrolle erweitert und ihre Macht verstärkt, indem die
Legitimität ihrer Entscheidungen abgesichert wird. Allerdings dokumentiert die
Fallstudie auch, daß Lernen und Nicht-Lernen zwei Seiten des gleichen Pro-
zesses sind, anders gewendet: Organisationslernen kann zur Ausblendung von
Wahrnehmung beitragen und - unbeabsichtigt - Nicht-Lernen generieren, wenn
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Since the early ‘50s, learning appeared to be a basic feature of corporate life,
and its organisational forms have been studied from many standpoints and con-
ceptualised in different ways in organisational theory. The ever growing litera-
ture demonstrates the empirical and theoretical richness of the concept of or-
ganisational learning and, later on, of the learning organisation.
At first glance, it might seem surprising that despite this diversity, organisa-
tional learning has rarely been studied in view of such fundamental concepts as
power and control, important for understanding organisations (Simon 1949; Bur-
rell 1988) as well as social life (Dahl 1957; Giddens 1984). Managerial writings
on this topic are usually typologies of a non-questioned phenomenon
(Mintzberg 1983) or the approaches confine themselves to a dysfunctional view
of illegitimate power (Crozier 1964; Mumby and Stohl 1991). The omission of
the power component of organisational learning may be considered as a con-
stitutive aspect of organisation theory, since a basic feature of its mechanis-
tic/organic paradigm (Maggi 1990) is to address power in the restrictive terms of
influence or leadership style (Barnard 1968; Machin and Lowe 1983), and to
picture management only as a technical, politically neutral activity (Townley
1993). Rather, according to a political/cultural perspective, we conceptualise
management as a reflexive social action the essence of which is power over
people and power through people (Willmott 1984; Clegg 1989).
The aim of this paper is to provide a critical examination of underlying
processes involved in applications of organisational learning theory, i.e. some
interventionists’ conception of the learning organisation. It presents a three-fold
sociological analysis. In the first part, managerial organisation theory and con-
sultants’ writings within the interpretative perspective of organisational learning
processes will be reviewed and analysed. Then a theoretical framework based
on concepts such as power, domination and control will be proposed. In a third
part, empirical work will be reviewed, in order to illustrate the processes by
which some unanticipated and unwelcome consequences of the very act of
building a learning organisation can appear in the long run.
Briefly summarising the approach developed here, one can state that:
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2- In the voluntaristic kind of organisational learning, the capacity for building a
learning organisation rests upon managerial power.
- Organisational learning, as a process involving others, has to be strictly and
continuously monitored in order to ensure its realisation and to keep control
over it.
- Monitoring of sensemaking processes requires a reinforcement of managerial
control and organisational surveillance for the gathering of relevant in-
formation.
- Development of organisational shared mental models (sensemaking
processes) is a social construction that tends to produce cognitive
homogeneity.
- Shared mental models are not politically neutral, since social conformity
enhances the leaders’ legitimacy and, consequently, power (and „managerial
comfort“). Thus, it has to be analysed as an ideology.
- Organisational learning through shared mental models can impede learning
in the long run, by „blinding“ the organisation (with collectively bounded
rationality) in which the non-conforming views are treated as illegitimate
because based on ideas that are different from the dominant ones.
The empirical findings presented show that the interpretative perspective of
organisational learning rarely works successfully for the organisation as a
whole. Interpretative stakes and schemes of sensemaking are as a rule shared
by only some team members or groups of subordinates. Since interpretation
appears as politically connoted and since beliefs are part of the imperative to
obey, sensemaking in an organisation seems closely related to domination. The
functionalist assumption of organisational consensus that stands behind some
trends of the organisational learning methodology appears rather incompatible
with the structural reality of political and cultural disparities. Confronted with the
imperative to share the normative system of the dominant group members of
the organisation could resort to technical or organisational subcultures in order
to save their endangered collective identities. As a result, conflicts of meaning
between hierarchical levels (Filion 1991) and a kind of cultural and ideological
„schism“ within the organisation can be engendered.
2. Organisational learning, cognitive homogeneity and
power: an analysis of some managerial writings
Despite the diversity of organisational learning theories (Fiol and Lyles 1985;
Huber 1991), metaphors (Tsoukas 1993, Gherardi 1996) and models
(Shrivastava 1983; Dodgson 1993), it is actually possible to find relative agree-
ment among authors on the core importance of shared culture or common
schemes of interpretation in the process of collective learning, even though
there is still confusion about what is really organisational learning (Weick
31991).1 That is, drawing from Daft and Huber’s (1987) distinction between
systems-structural and interpretative perspectives in the analysis of organisa-
tional learning, processes of sensemaking are crucial for learning if we consider
them as related to decision making processes (Schneider and Angelmar 1993)
on the one hand, and to decentralisation, delegation, and autonomy necessary
to knowledge activities on the other hand.
Building a learning organisation is not a random process but a voluntaristic
project (Pucik 1988), that needs leadership to exist, to be achieved (Greiner and
Schein 1988). It is a rational and target-oriented process that generally re-
sponds to the ideology of progress (maximisation, optimisation, etc). Learning is
usually viewed as „a key for competitiveness“ (Garatt 1987) and for organisa-
tional effectiveness (Schön 1975). Its aim is usefulness: „Essentially, learning
can be seen to have occurred when organisations perform in changed and
better ways. The goals of learning are useful outcomes“ (Dodgson 1993: 378).
Therefore, learning does not just appear by itself, it is a social product and has
to be created by leaders who „hold the keys“. Thus, in the interpretative per-
spective where sensemaking is the mainspring of learning, subjectivity and
power seem closely interwoven: „organisational learning occurs through shared
insight, knowledge, and mental models. (...) change is blocked unless all of the
major decision makers learn together, come to share beliefs and goals, and are
committed to take the actions necessary for change“ (Stata 1989: 64).
Argyris and Schön’s (1974) well-known distinction between single-loop and
double-loop learning and between model I and model II does not need presen-
tation here. The authors’ position is that organisational learning is impeded by
the discrepancy between individuals’ espoused theories (what they say) and
theories-in-use (what they do)2 which causes „fancy footwork“ and organisa-
tional defence patterns (Argyris 1990). For Argyris (1993a), as for most of his
followers, a stake of organisational learning is to make explicit tacit and instinc-
tively understood ideas. Double-loop learning may occur after „surfacing fun-
damental assumptions and gaining insight into why they arise“ (Isaacs
                                           
1 The continuous transformation of the organisational learning theory over the
last twenty years - from a rational to a normative standpoint - should probably
be analysed from the perspective of broad historical cycles. Barley and
Kunda (1992) have shown altrnated „waves“ of rational and normative
rhetorics of control depict the „evolution“ of managerial discourses and
organisation theory over the years. Those waves appear to be parallel to
economic cycles of expansion and contraction. The transformation of
organisational learning theories seems to correspond to their model.
2 For over twenty years Argyris (and Schön) postulates a fundamental
distinction between espoused theories and theories-in-use. But his writings
rarely explore a frequent situation: the skilled but „straightforward and
stubborn“ manager who does not realise the distinction of espoused and
used theories, is especially problematic when he appears unable to learn in
accordance with the dominant mental model. Diamond (1986) provides an
insightful psychoanaltytic critique of Argyris‘ model.
41993: 26). By making explicit „tacit thought (and) underlying thinking“ (Isaacs
1993: 31) by dialogue and confrontation, it is possible - so the argument - to
create learning through changing the „rules about how to interact“ (Argyris
1990). This point of view is clearly based on the assumption of the political neu-
trality of interaction and of dialogue. This neutrality refers to a functionalist
paradigm in which the political inequality of actors and the power-influence re-
lations that define and structure to some extent at least the organisational inter-
actions remain unconsidered. Therefore, this politically neutral paradigm is only
partly applicable to the organisational life. According to social theory and espe-
cially to Giddens (1984) and Goffman (1959), the social agent who can define
the rules of interaction exerts power on others and conditions the object of so-
cial control. This seems to be particularly true for hierarchical relations prevalent
in most organisations since the interpretative process is embedded into the
structural inequality of power and legitimacy among actors.
So, becoming a learning organisation means changing patterns of thinking
(Senge 1990a), a process which „inherently involves the questioning of one’s
values“ (Argyris 1983: 355) and self-identity (Weick 1995). Individuals have to
give up their theory-in-use (Argyris and Schön 1975; Argyris 1990) and adopt
beliefs, values, norms, premises and rationality that form the culture (Schein
1985) promoted in the organisational ideology (Beyer 1981). If organizational
learning relies on shared visions, this can only happen when individual mental
models or cognitive maps converge.3 This shared view of the world implies a
similar process of sensemaking (Weick 1995) that links subjective viewpoints
(beliefs, values) and rationality. As Nicolini and Meznar (1995: 741) argue, the
organisational social construction of learning is one of the channels through
which the managerial cognitive perspective and interpretation of the world is
imposed as the exclusively relevant view and becomes the dominant way of
acting and enacting. In this kind of learning, the collective sensemaking process
- a specific way of grasping problems and developing creative responses -
emerges from a relative homogeneity of individuals' subjectivity. According to
Schneider and Angelmar (1993), convergence of cognition is the condition for
consensus among top management teams. In this sense, the building of a
learning organisation may be interpreted as a purposive structured change
which represents a social construction of cognitive and sensemaking
homogeneity.
                                           
3 One must admit that organisational learning, in its interpretative standpoint,
remains conceptually quite vague. Despite the high complexity of the subject,
it is barely possible to find precise and explicit definitions of such general
notions as „ideas“, „beliefs, „values“, „vision“, „internal pictures“, „mental
models“ or even „cognitive maps“ (Lee, Courtney and Okeefe 1992). Major
authors in the fields of social representations and social psychology are
rarely quoted in spite of the relevance of their studies for organisational
learning (Berkowitz 1982; Breackwell and Canter 1989; Fraser and Gaskell
1988; Duveen and Lloyd 1989; Farr and Moscovici 1984).
5However, in order to understand this power-related process of instrumen-
talisation of culture, it appears necessary to analyse the relationship between
culture and learning. The growing use of the interpretative perspective in or-
ganisational learning can be considered as corresponding to the „organisational
culture“ trend (Lawson and Ventris 1992). In fact, the proposed definitions of
organisational culture are sometimes the same as those of the organisational
learning process: shared beliefs and values (Deal and Kennedy 1982), shared
meanings (Smircich 1983), shared interests (Young 1989) or shared ways of
perceiving and thinking (Allaire and Firsirotu 1984; Meek 1988).
Schein (1985) proposes an integrated theory of culture and learning in
which culture is defined as collective mental models, the assumptions of which
being deeply influenced by values and beliefs. He describes three levels in or-
ganisational culture: the cultural artefacts (dress codes, ways of talking, etc),
the espoused values, and the shared underlying assumptions. It is on the third
level that organisational learning may take place. But Schein cannot ignore that
culture and power are related in organisations. Since learning has to be imple-
mented and depends on culture, it becomes a target for power („leadership is
intertwined with culture formation“). A core function of management is the
„cultural shaping“ - the social construction - of the organisation. Building an or-
ganisation’s culture and shaping its evolution is the „unique and essential func-
tion“ of leadership (Schein 1985). Some authors are even more explicit about
the instrumentalisation of culture. It has to be controlled (Kilmann and Saxton
1985) and become efficient (Ouchi and Wilkins 1983), but can be a source of
alienation, too (Lincoln and Kalleberg (1990).
In later works, Schein (1993) - as well as Isaacs (1993) - stresses the vir-
tues of dialogue and addresses „communication failures and cultural misunder-
standings“ as indicators of differences between organisational subcultures. For
the author, organisational effectiveness will „increasingly hinge on the ability to
develop an overarching common language and mental model. [...] Any form of
organisational learning, therefore, will require the evolution of shared mental
models that cut across the subcultures of the organisation“ (Schein 1993: 41).
Since this evolution „is inhibited by current cultural rules“ (1993: 31) - the entro-
py of the „preservation of form“ (Lovell and Turner 1988: 416-17) - the „unique
and essential function“ of the leadership is to change the cultural rules of com-
munication and common understanding, i.e. the nature of culture and identity.
Therefore, one may consider that power is applied to culture through the
seemingly political neutrality of dialogue. An example for this perspective can be
found in the following anecdote: „The frequent complaint one hears from CEOs
(is) that, even though they have a lot of power and authority, they have great
difficulty getting their programs implemented. They complain that things are not
understood, that goals seem to change as they get communicated down the
hierarchy, or that their subordinates „screw up“ because they don’t really under-
6stand what is wanted“ (Schein 1993: 50; our emphasis). One can hardly be
more explicit about the aim of changing culture: effective power and obedience,
on the basis of shared culture and recognition of ideological legitimacy. As we
will see later, this new form of legitimacy consists of inducing the subordinates
(or team members) to adopt and internalise as their own the constraints, ra-
tionality, goals and, more generally, beliefs and ideas of the leader or their
superior.
The managerial writings of Peter Senge can be used as a significant ex-
ample of the power-related underlying assumptions of this form of organisa-
tional learning (or learning organisation) model. Those assumptions can be
grasped from his very first definitions of learning: „Learning is the process of
enhancing our capacity for effective action“ (Senge 1991: 39) - which is, ac-
cording to Clegg (1989) and Coopey (1995), a form of social power - and, in the
same way, „a learning organisation is a group of people continually enhancing
their capacity to create what they want to create (1991: 42) or „their capacity to
create the results they truly desire“ (Senge 1990a: 3). Drawing from Giddens’
theory of allocative resources (1984), one can associate this capacity for action
to managerial power.
In order to understand the power-related assumptions of this mechanistic
view, the critical paradigm seems to be adequate to analyse its hidden logic.
Theoretical approaches (Foucault 1977) and empirical research (Filion 1994)
have shown that a fundamental principle of power (and domination) is its invisi-
bility. It has to disappear in order to be efficient, to make the will realised. It has
to be silenced to persist. Thus, power can disappear in the impersonality of the
rules (Clegg 1981), be disembodied in technology (Giddens 1984), or be
negated by the discourse (Bourdieu 1982). As Schein (1993) uses the politically
neutral concept of dialogue (in Habermas’ sense [White 1988] but not in Fou-
cault’s), similarly, Senge refers to primitive cultures in which the leader’s only
power is to talk (Senge 1991: 42). However, anthropologists (Clastres 1974)
have shown that the basis of legitimacy in such cultures are quite different from
those of organisations in contemporary complex societies.4 By making this
analogy between corporate heads and „primitive“ leadership, Senge in effect
contributes to the silencing of actual power structure, thus reinforcing it and its
legitimacy.
Because „organisations face today the ever-growing complexity of the
world“ (Senge 1990a), the challenge is to change „patterns of thinking“ through
building new „mental models“ and „improving our internal pictures of how the
world works“ (Senge 1990a: 174). This cultural change is similar to the concept
                                           
4 In so-called primitive, more traditional cultures, the leader has no authority,
cannot impose discipline and does not represent the truth. Only the prophet
does. The prophet tells the truth, can demand discipline and submission to it
and to the leader because truth implies the recognition of its legitimacy.
7that Schein alludes to. One should be „living life from a creative as opposed to a
reactive viewpoint“ (Senge 1990a: 141). To come to this point, Senge proposes
five steps to arrive to his „fifth discipline“: personal mastery, mental models,
shared vision, team learning, systems thinking. Personal mastery consists in
„seeing reality objectively“ (1990a) and changing mental models is „making
one’s thinking more open to the influence of others“ (1990a) so that it is pos-
sible to build a shared vision through dialogue and discussion. Yet, since the
ontological nature of subjectivity (beliefs, ideas, assumptions about the world
and the reality) consists in the truth for oneself, and since all subjectivities have
equal value as soon as they are based on reason, who is right? Who can call on
absolute legitimacy? Who can have the power to question other individuals’
mental models?
The answer is, for the author, quite obvious: „the core leadership strategy is
simple: be a model“ (Senge 1990a: 173). A model of humility? Schein (1993)
pointed out how threatening such a position can be. On the contrary, in Senge’s
model the leader is superior to the subordinates or the team members because
„the first responsibility of a leader (...) is to define reality“ (1990b: 11). He is the
prophet. We can understand this in terms of a four-step procedure. First, „the
role of the leader as teacher starts with bringing to the surface people’s mental
models of important issues“. Second, „leaders as teachers help people re-
structure their views of reality“ (Senge’s emphasis). Third, „influence people to
view reality“, the one defined by the leader. Fourth, internalisation of the domi-
nant mental model: „the vision becomes more real in the sense of a mental
reality that people can truly imagine achieving“ (Senge 1990b: 12-13).
With some of the new ways of re-organisation of work and delegation of
decision-making process, the threat of loosing power and authority is at stake
since „local decision making and individual autonomy lead to management
anarchy unless (...)“ (Senge and Sterman 1992: 137). According to Frerichs
(1992), the goal is to build new alliances with the aim of minimising frictions.
Delegation of decision-making as a means of organisational learning implies
changing the mode of using power, not loosing power. Leaders - top manage-
ment - have to find a new way to obtain obedience and to gain a new form of
legitimacy. Here, the problem is clearly stated: „Just granting power, without
some method of replacing the discipline and order that come out of a command-
and-control bureaucracy, produces chaos“ (Senge et al. 1994: 14; our
emphasis).
Interpretative organisational learning finds here its ultimate goal: „We have
to learn how to disperse power so self-discipline can largely replace imposed
discipline“ (ibid). The core idea for success is therefore: „distributing power
while increasing self-discipline“ (Senge 1994: 15). The underlying political idea
with this type of organisational learning is to obtain cognitive homogeneity as a
means of gaining a fully accepted obedience through self-discipline. Since We-
8ber (1978) has defined the basic principle of the effectiveness of authority as
the will of the subordinates to obey (i.e. the legitimacy of authority is given by
the subordinates), self-discipline can be seen as the ultimate way of obtaining
obedience.
As our empirical studies have shown, this basic principle also works for
changing the individuals’ mental models. Only those who are ready to be
convinced can be convinced, i.e. those who already have the idea and the
desire of being convinced by the ideas of the leader, or in other words, the indi-
viduals who are committed. This is why, according to Senge, one of the basic
rules in building a learning organisation is to start with „small groups that form
around commitments“ (1991: 38) and that „in any case, the first step is to find
your natural partners“ (1991: 39; our emphasis).
It is important to consider here the very special status of the writings of Ar-
gyris and Schön. Largely used in the field of organisational learning and by in-
terventionists, they elaborate a useful methodology for organisational learning.
One can hardly find a call for cognitive homogeneity by these authors and in-
deed, they do not propose an explicit approach of rational or normative con-
vergence. Anchored in the functionalist paradigm, their work rests on the hy-
pothesis of mutual trust, confidence and openness. In this sense, the „social
virtue of model II“ is really a virtue: difficult to find in reality. Not to speak of the
political inequality of actors, of domination and of power-influence relation is
precisely what makes the power to be invisible. Thus, although Argyris and
Schön did not launch the specific trend of organisational learning which brings
and rests on cognitive homogeneity, they „opened the door“ for the use of their
theory for cognitive control. Because concertive control - as defined later - rests
upon an extended knowledge of everybody, Argyris’ methodology can be used
as a brilliant tool to ensure the full transparency of others. Moreover, if, for Ar-
gyris, organisational learning rests on a „reeducative process“ (1990:154), this
is the runway for a teacher to rise, a leader - maybe a prophet - who will define
the rules and will represent the social virtue. The „move“ from Argyris’ objective
and neutral position to a position of „cognitive control“ is effected by a school of
thought represented by Senge, Schein and Isaacs. But Kim (1993) is maybe the
one who explicitly considers that organisational learning will take place by the
construction of an overarching rationality that will encompass and go beyond
the rationality of individuals.
Other authors have more explicitly associated human resources manage-
ment with organisational learning. Solomon (1994) has coined the notion of
„servant leaders“ which identify „people who lead because they choose to serve
one another and the higher purpose“ (1994: 59). Because learning should not
be the sole privilege of the top management but must spread in the organisation
through „servant leaders“, he defines the role of human resources management
as to detect „real commitment“ in order to know „who the innovators are in the
9organisation“ (1994: 61). If „real commitment“ is maybe not cognitive homoge-
neity, it can be, by the empowerment of a certain type of actors, a crucial step to
the social construction of conformity. This idea can also be found in Argyris’
writings (1993b): organisational learning can be initiated by promoting the
learning of key individuals. Pucik (1988) proposes „learning-driven career plans“
(1988: 90) and, in any case, personnel appraisal must be linked to learning in
order to evaluate and reward learning activities and the „cognitive fit“ (Filion
1998). Related to our argument, this implies that if co-optation and cognitive af-
finities may be adequate means to set up convergence and homogeneity at the
top managerial level, a social construction of cognitive conformity has to be
carried out at group or organisation levels, involving monitoring of individuals
and control of learning processes.
3. Concertive control, power and legitimacy
Anyone who is aware of the changes that occurred in the business field
during the last twenty years knows that corporations act less and less as
bureaucracies even if some of their organisational foundations still persist.
Human relations, sociotechnical systems, semi-autonomous groups, quality
circles, flexible production, participative management, MBO, TQM, just-in-time
and numerous other innovations concerning delegation or decentralisation of
decision making and involving all organisational strata changed the manner in
which command-and-control is performed.5 It is our argument that these mul-
tiple changes are targeted at a new balance of organisational coercion and
legitimacy of authority. Therefore, a new theory of control is needed. Recent
studies converge to indicate that a new form of control progressively emerged
from the trends of organisational culture and organisational learning.
Edwards (1981) proposed a three-level typology of control forms that are
historically successive even though not totally substituting each other. The first
type is „simple control“, i.e. the direct, face-to-face, surveillance and command
relationship that takes place between superior and subordinates or boss-em-
ployees in small or family-owned companies. Although, according to Edwards,
simple control has inherited from the XIXth century the image of authori-
tarianism and alienation, it is still an effective control mode. The second type is
„technological control“ which had its apogees in scientific management and the
assembly line. Control is here embodied in technology and work organisation
(Clegg 1975). More recent forms of technological control and surveillance are
represented by integrated production and computerised systems for manage-
ment. The third type is „bureaucratic control“. Impersonal rules and staff-and-
                                           
5 Still, the structure of domination remains in principle unchallenged (Leflaive
1996). In the same way, Sewell and Wilkinson (1992) have shown how just-
in-time systems reinforce discipline and surveillance, while Tuckman (1994)
indicated clearly how total quality management (TQM) can take place in a
bureaucratic organisation.
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line divisions provide sets of roles which integrate control of work processes
and of individuals. Bureaucratic control is particularly efficient because it is in-
corporated in every day supervision, in legal-rational rules and routines, making
the bureaucracy a powerful form of domination, i.e. an iron cage (Weber 1978).
From Marx’s factory to Taylor’s scientific management; from Mayo’s human
relations to Ouchi’s corporate culture, the „problem of order“ (Whitley 1977) re-
mains of crucial concern. This main problem in modern organisations has been
- and is ever still - to discipline, to ensure the compliance of the individual to the
domination structure where a small group of individuals have authority over a
larger one (Weber 1978). Unlike total institutions (Goffman 1963; Giddens
1984), the disciplinary domination of the modern business enterprise rests upon
two principles: coercion and legitimacy.
Following Foucault (1977) and Clegg (1998), organisational coercion is
functioning via disciplinary power in order to fulfill the compliance of all indi-
viduals to sets of roles, actions and procedures codified in disciplinary rules.
The capacity of dominant actors to define the rules of action, to monitor their
implementation and to punish disobedience or incompetence is the capacity to
produce uniformity of social conducts. Administrative regulations and devices of
human resource management like personnel appraisal systems are contem-
porary forms of disciplinary power (Townley 1993; Filion 1998). Surveillance is
thus a basic feature of modern organisations (Dandeker 1990) and a means of
administrative power (Giddens 1984) since management can be defined as in-
formation processing for decision making. Concerning our topic of organisa-
tional learning, Chandler, in his study of General Motors (1964) pointed out the
core importance of surveillance - bringing flows of information to the manage-
ment - that made the organisation more „intelligent“. Direct or sensorial surveil-
lance of individuals, work process control, and information gathering are parts of
the monitoring activity (Giddens 1976 and 1984). More recently, computerised
information systems modified the traditional distinction between surveillance
and control in bureaucracies and industrial business. However, this is before all
a change of form and does not indicate an erosion of power structures. To the
extend that these power structures are still rather visible there is a risk concern-
ing the basis of legitimacy.
In this context, concertive control can be considered as a fourth type of
control. Designated as „unobtrusive control“ by Tompkins and Cheney (1985),
this form is defined by Perrow as „the control of the cognition premises under-
lying action“ (1986: 129). Concertive control rests upon „a set of core values,
such as the values found in a corporate vision statement. In a sense, concertive
control reflects the adoption of a new substantive rationality, a new set of con-
sensual values, by the organisation and its members“ (Barker 1993: 411). In
this „post-bureaucratic“ model, control is achieved by controlling the self-control.
It is functioning the way that the top management, team members and/or sub-
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ordinates, all adopt value-based discourses which „infer ‘proper’ behavioural
premises: ideas, norms, or rules that enable them to act in ways functional for
the organisation“ (Barker 1993: 412). Concertive control rests upon a displace-
ment of the control: from action to the premises of action (or from decision to
the premises of decision). The previous section has illustrated the way in which
this displacement can occur according to the literature on organisational
learning. But yet, this is not at all brand-new. Simon (1947) already drew
attention to the control of the factual and ethical premises as a key in the
decision making process, and stressed that this control is directly related to the
exercise of authority. Therefore, homogeneity and control of the premises of
decision are of crucial importance, a fortiori if the actors are at the top level of
the hierarchy (Lovell and Turner 1988). As a precursor, Simon (1947) pointed
out early on what has been recently re-discovered by managerial and
organisational theorists: the role of indoctrination.
Concertive control cannot be conceived nor achieved without a prerequisite
ideological apparatus which defines and states what is at stake. As it has been
said, ideas, beliefs, mental models and shared views of the world are usually
not defined a priori and they can change according to various conditions.
Nevertheless, the characteristic of any ideology is the imperative of sharing the
ideas. In accordance with the basic principle of any ideological apparatus, the
organisational ideology refers to subjectivity as the basis for rational action or
decision making. This is why action is not anymore the object of control but the
individual itself, the way he/she thinks, his/her identity, his/her way to internalise
the stated norms and values (Berger and Luckmann 1966). The question may
be different for top managers who elaborate the shared vision (they have to
convince each other, even if the hierarchical-political status may play an im-
portant role at this level, too). But concerning the diffusion and sharing of the
ideology across the organisation, the pre-existence of the ideological apparatus
(the dominant discourse to be internalised) to the very act of believing trans-
forms the prescribed ideology in a new form of cultural domination which in-
volves concertive control. Here, concertive control is quite near to the „ideo-
logical control“ defined by Czarniawska and Hedberg as one of the four modes
of the „control cycle“. Refering also to Robbins (1983) and Smircich and Morgan
(1982) they speak of ideological control as „producing commitment and a
perception change in people“ (Czarniawska and Hedberg 1985:22-23) by the
use of organisational myths, rituals and metaphors. But a difference can be
pointed out: concertive control mainly rests on the structural reinforcement of
the interpretative process through human resources management. Commitment
and belief is not anymore a wish of the leaders but an imperative made to sub-
ordinates.
Implementation of ideology and concertive control can be achieved through
provisions for detection, recognition and empowerment of „cognitively conform-
ing“ individuals. But the literature - and some of our case studies - show that the
preferred way for implementation is the social construction of homogeneity.
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Cognitive homogeneity can be partly based on affinities, but can also be en-
larged to ideological convergence. Coopey (1995), Mintzberg (1983) - as well
as Schein (1968) - have pointed out the link between power and ideology.
Ideas, values, norms and beliefs which constitute the dominant ideology have to
be shared by members of the management and subordinates in order to ensure
the efficiency of power. Since the organisational dominant ideology serves the
leaders’ power the imperative to internalise the ideology implies a social con-
struction involving sensemaking processes and affecting the identity of indi-
viduals (Berger and Luckmann 1966).6 In this sense, the social construction
process is to be defined as the use of power for shaping culture and identity.
Concertive control thus means being in „cognitive control“ of the individuals who
constitute the human/social substance of the organisation.
Concertive control as a form of obedience relationship may enhance the
leaders’ power and authority. Shared mental models and cognitive homogeneity
not only provide a feeling of security, reinforcing leaders’ self-image but can
also - and are meant to - engender collective action that is conforming to the
dominant view. It would not be adequate to draw from Foucault’s „docile bodies“
a direct analogy, such as „docile minds“, since „cognitive discipline“ can strongly
enable action - although within fixed limits of pre-determined rationality and
selected „cognitive tracks“. Instead, „compliant thinking“ seems a suitable
expression to describe the means and the goals of organisational learning in the
interpretative perspective. In this context, the basic principles of power remain
unchallenged: to ensure the full visibility of others (to make explicit looming tacit
ideas and assumptions - Argyris’ Model II) and - conversely - the invisibility of
power (by consensus and shared meanings in discourses). It is the subjectivity
that forms the target for managerial action, via surveillance and control. As a
metaphor, the „mental panopticon“ is probably the best way to illustrate the in-
terpretative perspective of the learning organisation.
Thus, the legitimacy of authority is much stronger if we consider, as men-
tioned before, that obedience rests upon the will of the subordinates to obey
and the agreement to the „substance“ of the decision or the way of seeing the
world (the sensemaking process). Legitimacy (as the effectiveness of authority
through the voluntaristic and enthusiastic nature of obedience) is therefore more
plainly recognised since collaborators and subordinates already share the
premises of the decision. In other words, organisational learning on the basis of
shared mental models enhances power on the top by enhancing the willingness
of subordinates to obey, i.e. to agree. Maybe the term „substantive legitimacy“
is suitable to indicate this „twist of legitimacy“ (compared to bureaucratic legal-
rational legitimacy): Individuals do not conform because they have to, but be-
cause they agree to the substance of decision, sharing the underlying premises.
                                           
6 There are also other ideologies in every organisation such as class ideology
among the workers or technical cultures, but they are not dominant.
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A previous study (Filion 1994) has indicated that concertive control does
not replace bureaucratic control. In fact, the political nature of the organisation
remains unchanged: The demand for cultural and ideological conformity adds
up to political domination. In this form of organisational learning that requires
the spread and adoption of a specific culture and ideology, the power resources
(Giddens 1984) are applied on culture as a new object, thus reinforcing the very
status of authority.
The consequences for organisational learning – still in its interpretative per-
spective - are tremendous since the shared premises and rationality do not
have to be made explicit. The participants are already chosen and built to reach
consensus, to share the same view of the world and to anticipate a similar
learning. The resulting „managerial comfort“ of homogeneity, however, is
achieved at the expense of diversity of views, a fact that can ultimately produce
some kind of organisational blindness.
But reality and organisational life are rarely as they should be from a politi-
cal point of view. Can ideological and cognitive homogeneity be achieved and
sustained for a long time without countervailing effects? The fieldwork con-
ducted in different organisations has shown some unintended critical implica-
tions.
4. Hierarchical networking and „cognitive trap“: some em-
pirical findings
The theoretical framework presented above rests on empirical studies carried
out by the first author in various types of organisations and using the interpreta-
tive paradigm of organisational learning. Despite important differences con-
cerning technology, structure, product, culture and history among those organi-
sations, undeniable similarities have been found as well relating to the underly-
ing processes and implications of organisational learning and especially con-
cerning aspects of power and control.
In order to point out some unanticipated consequences of learning organi-
sation based on concertive control, the case of the Bank Central Back-Office
(BCBO) will be presented here. The choice of this organisation - part of one of
the largest French banks – rested on its very special status: It had a key posi-
tion in the bank’s global strategy which was to modernise the banking activities.
The fieldwork has been done in two parts: the first wave of interviews was con-
ducted around the mid 80s, one year after the arrival of the new general
manager; the second part has been done four years later. All together, 120 in-
terviews of at least two hours each have been conducted, ranging from the
bank’s human resources manager to the „boy“ (who carries the checks and
business papers), in accordance with the quotas method. In this two-steps pro-
cedure, we re-interviewed (at least) the same persons in order to analyse the
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„time effect“ on their appraisal of this type of organisational change and learn-
ing.
Frequently named - both by management and employees - „the factory in
the bank“, this 700 people bureaucratic/taylorist organisation was, despite the
highly routinised procedures, a world of stress, time pressure and heavy work
load. Acting as the central treatment office of all internal and external banking
transactions realised by the 620 local banks of the French capital, the BCBO
had a long history marked not only by a strong inertia due to taylorism, top-
down bureaucratic organisation, old technology and low productivity, but also by
problematic work relations which had engendered many labour conflicts during
the end of the seventies and the beginning of the eighties.
Before the so-called „modernisation“ process was started, the BCBO was
composed of six functional departments (finance, human resources, accounting,
etc.) and seven „production“ departments. Among them, five handled all
commercial (portfolio) and savings operations allocated on a geographical basis
(corresponding to an area of the city). The two others were specialised depart-
ments, one for all bank transfers (before all with corporate clients), the other for
credits and special financial operations. It was therefore no surprise that we ob-
served during the first fieldwork a strong technical culture where skills have
been developed in the long run, by shared experience, for better coping with the
daily, weekly and monthly time constraints.
Challenged by a stronger competition resulting from changes in the eco-
nomic environment but also triggered by new demands from corporate clients,
the bank’s top management developed a new strategy of providing banking
service based on flexibility, quick response to the customer and total quality
management. As it is often the case, the arrival of a new general manager at
the BCBO with full support from the bank’s top management has been the
starting point of major structural and cultural changes. According to the general
manager, the main aim of this „modernisation“ project was not about changing
the technical procedures and routines but rather the way of seeing technical
problems and the relationship to the clients. The aim was to become a more
flexible and efficient organisation through delegation of responsibility, multi-
skilling, autonomy and collective learning. In fact, the reorganisation through
interdependent structural and cultural changes was considered as the prerequi-
site for learning to take place and, progressively, to autonomously learn how to
learn.
Right from the start, the social construction of cognitive homogeneity has
been conceptualised by the new general manager as a political process com-
prising a structural and a cultural side. Both of them have been based on a view
of management resting on value-based mutual trust and agreement (shared
ideas) as a basis for co-operation and hierarchical relations. As a first step, the
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organisational structure has been deeply modified. Intermediate levels have
been removed, the pyramidal structure being flattened from a six to a three-
level hierarchy. All operational departments were directly placed under the
authority of the general manager to avoid „interferences“ of intermediary levels
or assistants and to ensure direct collective decision making. The aim of in-
creasing „direct control“ on the lower management level and to improve infor-
mation and communication flows has also been an opportunity to transfer out of
the BCBO (with full support from the head-office) staff members considered as
„non-conform“, „bureaucratic“ or „narrow-minded“; those judged as reluctant to
learning, not willing to adopt the new ideas and to agree with the new dominant
ideological view on management. The two specialised departments have been
progressively „dried out“ as multi-skilling took place in the other departments.
Changes in the work process using computerised technology have been set up.
Moreover, the operational functioning has been reorganised by introducing the
delegation of both management and technical organisation tasks.
On the cultural side, the organisational ideology promoted by the general
manager through corporate statements rested on the assumption that
management and employees should share the same ideas if they were ex-
pected to co-operate efficiently. Consequently, a value-based culture has been
constructed through a „corporate project“ stipulating core ideas, values and
norms. The social construction of cognitive homogeneity rested on detection,
symbolic reinforcement and promotion into key functions (empowerment) of
conforming persons. In concrete terms, it started with a diagnosis and selection.
All staff members - after meeting and discussion - have been „ranked“ ac-
cording to a three-level classification: „synergetic“ (sharing the same mental
model and ideas); „more or less acceptable“ (to be convinced); and „intolerable“
(to be transferred out of the organisation or in a functional position). As a
second step, the same procedure has been conducted for employees by each
department manager. Because delegation of responsibilities and collective de-
cision-making implied the acknowledgment of a set of basic principles (the
stated values), norms and ideas represented a crucial part of personnel ap-
praisal. Salary raises, rewards and symbolic recognition were linked to criteria
such as autonomy, skills in creative problem-solving, „good initiatives“ and „real
involvement“ - all defined from the dominant standpoint. Although „cognitive
maps“ or „mental models“ were not explicitly parts of the communicative culture
of the organisation, expressions like „sharing the same ideas“, „being able to
work together“, „to be open minded“ and „having synergy“ were currently
employed to characterise the qualities of the subordinates sharing the dominant
view in the organisation.
In five years, about 230 work groups - of various size and for different dura-
tion - have been created. Ranging from strategic decision committee to quality
circle, from technical problem-solving to co-ordination and communication
groups, those work groups involved almost every member of this organisation at
least for some time. In general, there were two types of groups: reflection
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groups and operational groups. Those temporary structures were linked by the
same goal: knowledge creation, collective learning and institutionalisation of the
newly developed procedures. At the beginning, participation was voluntary,
each group being handled by a „synergetic“ manager who had personally re-
ceived his mandate from the general manager after being trained particularly
concerning rhetoric skills and control of discussion. In fact, besides the official
goal of knowledge creation, those discussion groups were targeted at three un-
stated aims:
- To make explicit usually tacit assumptions in cognition processes of the par-
ticipants and, therefore, to detect and publicly recognise the value-conform-
ing actors;
- to convince „in-between“ participants to join the leader’s position;
- to ensure that decision-making processes in which the discussion groups
were involved - and their results - are in conformity with the general orienta-
tion of the BCBO so as to consolidate the organisational coherence.
Taking these various aspects, the knowledge creation process was from the
very beginning targeted to confirm the dominant view in the organisation.
In daily life, the rise of autonomy - due to computerised technology and
delegation of decision-making to the work teams - has been accompanied by in-
creasing surveillance and control. Since most of the employees had about 20
years of seniority - which explains both the high level of competency and of
„defensive footwork“ - the crucial stake for management was about preventing
„divergent autonomy“, i.e. to make sure not to lose control over work teams. Ar-
guing that it was necessary to „know everyone personally“, monitoring activities
have been conducted in two ways: by hidden computerised control of the work
as well as by direct (visual) and/or indirect (hearsay) surveillance. The basic
rationale was the same: to detect and empower the conforming persons and to
convince or to delegitimise the non-conforming ones.
After all, the Bank Central Back-Office has been, according to our analysis,
an excellent learning organisation. Technical debugging and innovative
changes were rapidly accomplished through collective problem-solving, and by
the capacity of all involved persons - at least in the first years - to understand
others’ assumptions, to push discussion forward and to develop creative ideas.
The involvement in quality circles and other structures was high and a sense of
membership - of being part of something - progressively arose during the first
two to three years, creating a stimulating emulation at all levels. Quality im-
provement were documented by significant decreases of the monthly rate of
complaints from customers. The organisation clearly learned and changed.
But after almost four years of constant learning and improvement, the or-
ganisation has tended to stabilise and, later on, started to „unlearn“: Unsolved
problems being pushed away, new problems with corporate clients not being
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taken into account, people being less motivated and disagreement arising in
decision-making processes in some departments at various levels. The reap-
pearance of „already solved“ problems puzzled the top management team
which had not thought of the possibility of a cultural and political crisis. Blinded
by part of the subordinates and other team members sharing the same view of
the world, the general manager had not grasped the importance of the moaning
from parts of the employees and their management teams. What had
happened?
The first unintended - and unwelcome - consequence of the management
of a learning organisation via “cognitive homogenisation” was a feeling of mis-
trust appearing among more or less conforming actors due to the contradiction
noticed between the official/ideological discourse on mutual trust and the reality
of monitoring and control activities, even those that seemed justified. For most
of the employees and parts of management teams, autonomy meant autonomy
and learning implied an opportunity to increase their know-how and their col-
lective autonomy. This is why the feeling of a cultural mismatch progressively
developed. To summarise the position of employees, learning, improving one’s
own performance, doing a good job and actively working for the well-being of
the company did not mean „being on the side of the boss“. As one of them said:
„I am here to do the best I can. Not to be brain-washed and to think like the
boss“. As a kind of counter-effect, learning reinforced collective identity forma-
tion among the groups of employees and among their direct managers. And
since the political nature of the organisation implies a structural inequality be-
tween strata of actors, subcultures were developing in contrast to the official
political structure. Although unintended, this outcome should not be surprising:
The process of forging an organisational/cognitive homogeneity has lead
„naturally“ to a cultural crisis because the very foundation of this form of organ-
isational learning is political domination.
The second - and the most important - unanticipated consequence is a
side-effect of the social construction of cognitive homogeneity. Since there is no
equality among individuals and since the management of homogeneity rests
upon strong personal affinities, the top management team tended to be like a
court. Cultural/cognitive convergence does not annihilate power-related strate-
gic games. So, privileged team members or subordinates behaving as culturally
conforming actors gave positive feedback to the higher levels, each of them de-
legitimising the non-conforming views, ideas and values. Thus, effective power
and strong „management comfort“ have been experienced by the general man-
ager. However, disinformation, too, has been growing gradually as the dark side
of this management comfort. Moreover, the hierarchical networking used to
build the consensus-style decision making led to unintended consequences of
concertive control. Cognitive homogeneity was an imperative, which means to
conform to ideas, beliefs and assumptions that had been developed at the top
level by managers already sharing those ideas. Indeed, those mental models
were considered as truth, as the best way to work collectively. In fact, hierar-
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chical networking was implemented when there was a need - such as time-
saving, efficiency and effectiveness - to work with the ones that were judged
truly loyal or, in other words, „really with us“. Collecting information on the indi-
viduals’ ways of thinking, concertive control and classification had provided the
basis of networking. In order to secure influence on all organisation levels, the
idea was to cooperate with people only who share the basic ideas on how
management should be done. Those individuals were called „relays“ or „effi-
ciency channels“. Mutual trust, obedience, legitimacy of actions and team
working were high, but only among the individuals sharing the dominant view of
the reality. A sense of inequity progressively emerged across the company,
since the rewards and bonuses were systematically reserved for conforming
individuals, despite the involvement of the others. Finally, cultural inequality had
reinforced political inequality. Divergences of mental models had only „disap-
peared“ temporarily, but they were just „under cover“. Because the credo of
ideological homogeneity asked for total devotion, it was quite difficult for cul-
turally non-conforming actors to „voice“ (Hirschmann 1970). Their only alterna-
tives were apathy (Bajoit 1988) or to politically play „loyalty“, if they were not
prepared to chose the „exit“ solution.
In the end, the major unintended consequence has been relative blindness
of the organisation, a specific form of bounded rationality (Simon 1991). First,
the hierarchical networking through cognitive homogeneity had given a biased
view of the reality of the organisation, disguising the character and strength of
existing subcultures. Second, the incapacity to consider non-conforming views
of innovation or problem-solving as creative alternatives entangled the
organisation in „closed thinking“, As a consequence, identification of problems
and solutions were confined to the range of possibilities that the officially
institutionalised cognitive routines described and prescribed. This phenomenon,
known as „cognitive trap“ or „learning trap“ (Levitt and March 1988), should
however be understood in a slightly different way. Here, the blindness is not due
to routine or to a false sense of confidence. Instead, it has to be interpreted as
an unintended consequence of the will to create cognitive homogeneity and to
obtain full legitimacy for the leader’s ideological system.
5. Conclusion: evading the „cognitive trap“
In this paper, we have proposed a critical rereading of some managerial writings
on the interpretative perspective of organisational learning. Our aim was to
highlight how the premises of those theories rest upon a new form of domina-
tion in organisations based on the imperative of cognitive compliance. The role
of ideology and the imperative of cognitive homogeneity as major means to
obtain discipline in organisational settings appear to be the key for under-
standing this form of domination.
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The processes involved in the implementation of the interpretative concept
of organisational learning insert themselves deeply in the procedures of control
and are normatively loaded with the aim of producing social and cognitive ho-
mogeneity inside the organisation. This seems to be a powerful way of stabilis-
ing or enhancing the legitimacy of decisions. Consequently, organisational
learning via cognitive compliance appears to be a particularly fitting methodol-
ogy to cope with quickly and deeply changing environments without risking in-
ternal chaos or resistances. In fact, the power structure in organisations may be
enhanced by interpretative and concertive control because it is generating
knowledge on rationalities and subjectivities (Foucault 1980), and, therefore,
control on individuals (Dahl 1986).
However, a critical element is built into the process of organisational learn-
ing if it is conceptualised as making explicit tacit thoughts with the aim to form a
common and unique mental model. By making mandatory ideological conver-
gence of all members of the organisation this form of concertive control under-
mines the very basis of concerted organisational action: individual identities and
- at least - some diversity of (bounded) rationalities.
Our empirical findings indicate that the conceptual distinction between
systems-structural and interpretative perspectives in organisational learning
(Daft and Huber 1987) appears to be partly inoperative since the social con-
struction of cognitive homogeneity rests upon systems-structural aspect of man-
agement. Moreover, while concentrating on a maximum of homogeneity for
power-related and management reasons, an organisation may sacrifice its po-
tentials for adaptation that are associated with diversity. The unintended con-
sequence of cognitive homogeneity and hierarchical networking may force, in
the long run, the organisation to unlearn (in the sense of Hedberg, 1981) its own
beliefs, values, cognitive patterns and underlying ideological assumptions and
to restart from new premises.
How can an organisation avoid the „learning trap“ and prevent to get caught
up in too restrictive „cognitive tracks“? The wisdom of considering that power
can not rest for a long time on the control of interpretative schemes - or any
cultural dimension- appears to be one of the best advises, because leadership
is to stay of a political nature. If the leaders’ legitimacy has to be reinforced
through the imperative of a „one track cognition“ conforming to the dominant
view of the world, the leadership practice may deserve a serious reappraisal.
When being contradicted or isolated in one’s view of the world appears to be
difficult to bear, it’s time for a critical self-evaluation. Learning to learn also
means learning to doubt - and learning to fail - about one’s own certainties,
about one’s own rationality. It also means to refrain from the deeply rooted de-
sire to obtain from subordinates and team members full legitimacy and absolute
recognition of one’s truth. This implies trusting others and others’ autonomy as
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well as admitting that being in a position of leading a group or a company does
not mean having always the best view of the world and of reality.
While it is seducing for the top managers to enlarge and reassure both their
power and legitimacy through enforcing cognitive homogeneity, it may be wiser
- at least on a longer term perspective - to institutionalise a kind of countervail-
ing structures, e.g. union representatives/work councils (Czarniawska and Hed-
berg 1985). An alternative could also be to create so-called „weird think tanks“
and encourage their members to produce divergent visions based on radically
different premises and rationalities as well as alternative interpretations of po-
litical and socio-economic environments. With entire freedom of thinking institu-
tionally safeguarded against marginalisation or sanctions the chances increase
that organisations are able to catch up the right ideas at the right time. How-
ever, if, as it was stated at the beginning of this paper as a premise, manage-
ment represents power over people and power through people, how can a
countervailing structure or even a „weird think tank“ prevent from falling into the
„cognitive trap“? The answer is maybe to make the power visible or, at least, to
consider it as a basic feature of dialogue. To hold a dialogue, to understand
others’ position and to make explicit everyone’s assumptions and tacit ideas
does not automatically imply or assure agreement and the construction of a
cognitive consensus. On the contrary, dialogue can also mean discussion on
the basis of hardly reconcilable standpoints. Compromises are among the hall-
marks of enlighted companies. Organisational learning theory rejoins here deci-
sion making theory. In contrast to the ideal of attaining optimal and perfect ra-
tionality in reality, only a bounded rationality is possible, bounded by available
information but also by norms, values and ideas. Thus, one could consider or-
ganisational learning in a context in which different interests, cultures and ra-
tionalities articulate in the construction of compromises: temporary solutions to
specific problems, collectively elaborated by specific actors agreed upon for an
unknown but limited period.
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